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Abstract: The recent paper by Goetzmann et al. (2002) suggests that fund managers subject to a
performance review have an adverse incentive to engage in portfolio strategies that have the
unfortunate attribute that they can expose the fund investor to significant downside risk. Weisman
(2002) uses the term “informationless investing” to describe this behavior, and argues that these
strategies are “peculiar to the asset management industry in general, and the hedge fund industry in
particular” and that these strategies “can produce the appearance of return enhancement without
necessarily providing any value to an investor.” Just how prevalent are these practices in the fund
management business? On the basis of a unique database of daily transactions and holdings of a set
of forty successful Australian equity managers, we find evidence that individual managers do engage
in this trading behavior, particularly when they form part of a team within a large decentralized
money management operation and are compensated in the form of an annual bonus based on
performance. This result is broadly consistent with the theoretical and empirical results of the
principal agent literature which highlight the adverse  consequences for the long term objectives of
principals where agents are compensated based on observable short term performance. It is also
consistent with recent results from the behavioral finance literature which suggest that agents
narrowly focus on individual security gambles independent of overall portfolio value considerations.
JEL Classification: G23
Keywords: Informationless Trading; Sharpe Ratios; Performance Evaluation
_____________________________________________________________________
† Corresponding Author.  E-mail: sbrown@stern.nyu.edu
* We thank Walter Boudry, Ned Elton, Andrew Weisman and Jeffrey Wurgler and the participants of seminars at the
University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana and the University of New South Wales  for helpful comments. Research
funding from  the Australian Research Council (DP0346064) is also gratefully acknowledged by Gallagher and
Swan.
1A brief sampling of this literature would include Grant (1977), Roll (1978), Mayers and
Rice (1979), Jobson and Korkie (1981, 1984), Dybvig and Ross (1985), Admati and Ross
(1985), Lehmann and Modest (1987), Elton, Gruber, Das, and Hlvaka (1993), Breen, Jegadeesh
and Ofer (1986), Connor and Korajczyk (1986), Grinblatt and Titman (1989) and Chen and Knez
(1996). Further references can be found at:
 http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sbrown/performance/bibliography.html 
1
INFORMATIONLESS TRADING
I. Introduction
The purpose of developing quantitative measures of investment performance is to assess the
extent to which the investment manager can add value over what could be obtained at low cost
investing in passive benchmarks. This was the original motivation that Cowles (1933) proposed
for using benchmark comparisons.  Later work by Jensen (1968) and others refined the
procedure to control for differences in risk, and Sharpe (1966) proposed comparing managers on
the basis of zero net investment returns per unit of standard deviation risk. While quite a
literature has developed to tweak these performance metrics1, it remains true that most
practitioners continue to pay a lot of attention to the simple Jensen alpha and Sharpe ratio
measures for investment performance measurement. 
In his early work, Cowles (1933) was sensitive to the fact that reliable inferences about relative
performance would depend on assumptions about the statistical distribution of performance
measures. Indeed it is well understood that these measures are sensitive to the assumption that
2See, for example, the recent paper by Agarwal and Naik (2003).
3See, for example, the work of Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986) and Glosten and
Jagannathan (1994). For an application in the Australian context, see Pinnuck (2003).
2
returns are normally distributed. The use of the Sharpe ratio has come under recent scrutiny
particularly when used to evaluate hedge fund managers who can create highly non-Normal
payoffs by extensive use of derivative instruments2. One obvious way to resolve this issue is to
consider adjusting the performance measure for the value of the implied option positions3.
The fact remains however, that the Sharpe ratio and Jensen alpha are still widely used as
summary measures of investment performance. In addition, as Busse (1999) points out, they play
an important role in managerial compensation because risk-adjusted performance affects fund
flows.  Gruber (1996) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) document evidence of a performance-flow
relation, where fund flows are disproportionately directed to mutual funds exhibiting high past
period performance. Sawicki (2000) confirms that similar results follow for Australian managed
funds and finds that funds flow on the basis of gross returns or risk adjusted returns.  Sirri and
Tufano (1998) and Jain and Wu (2000) also identify that the performance-flow effect is related
to the marketing effort and media attention received by active mutual funds.  Of particular
interest is that Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) find important differences in the shape of
performance-flow relation between mutual fund (convex) and pension fund (near linear)
segments of the market.  While Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) find that Jensen’s alpha and flow is
both significant and positively related, they show that pension fund flow is not as responsive to
the magnitude of out-performance for ‘winners’ (as is the case for mutual funds) but is related to
4See, for example, Perold and Salomon (1991), Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996),
Chevalier and Ellison (1997, 1999), Khorana (1996, 2001), and Busse (2001).
5Spurgin (2001).
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whether the manager has actually outperformed the market index ex-post.  Their research
indicates that institutional fund inflow (ex-ante) is determined by a manager’s ability to deliver
positive Jensen’s alpha and a low tracking error (ex-post).
For actively managed funds, maximizing risk-adjusted performance is an important goal in terms
of the incentive structures that operate in the investment industry.  In the first instance, given that
the profitability of investment complexes is typically determined on the basis of aggregate funds
under management, investment managers should therefore be motivated to maximize their asset
size.  Second, to the extent that performance, flow, risk-shifting behavior, top management
turnover and managerial profitability are all intertwined, this raises the possibility that
investment managers might attempt to game performance metrics for the purposes of ensuring
their own survival.4  Gaming may arise through the use of derivatives in the case of hedge
funds5, or by active trading where use of derivatives is otherwise restricted. Weisman (2002)
identifies such behavior as “informationless investing”. Goetzmann et al.(2002) (henceforth
GISW) identify the conditions under which such behavior will in fact lead to a Sharpe ratio
greater than that of the benchmark. They further show that in a complete market leveraging such
a portfolio will lead to an arbitrarily large Jensen alpha measure.
This result would remain an intellectual curiosity but for the fact that as a general rule
informationless trading implies significant downside risk for the investor. It also implies
6One example of informationless trading is doubling, where the investor increases his or
her position on a loss to be recovered on a gain. A good example of this is the trading behavior
of Nicholas Leeson which led to the Barings disaster (see Brown and Steenbeek 2001). This
gives rise to the famous St. Petersburg Paradox where the investor will encounter ruin with
probability one. Many philosophers, starting with Bernoulli have questioned the rationality of
agents who enter this game (for an excellent discussion see Keynes (1952) pp. 316-320).
Weisman (2002) points out that short volatility trading (long benchmark, short out of the money
calls and puts) has the same attribute, and yet many sophisticated investors have participated in
this game, a notable example being Long Term Capital Management (see Lowenstein (2000)).
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significant systemic risk for the capital markets in which the investor trades. It is difficult to
reconcile such trading with rational behavior on the part of a long term investor6. Prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979) provides one explanation for this behavior. Experiments have
confirmed that agents prefer to realize gains and gamble on losses. An implication of this
preference is that the agent would choose a portfolio with payout that is concave relative to
benchmark. In other words, the agent would sell out on a gain, but increase the position on a loss
hoping that the gamble would restore the amount lost. While informationless trading implies
concave portfolio strategies, prospect theory would tend to explain why agents might choose
extreme doubling strategies that do not lead to increased Sharpe ratios a priori.
On the other hand, evaluating the investment performance of a manager who engages in this
conduct presupposes that the ruin event has not (yet) taken place. Based on a review of ex post
investment performance, this manager will appear to be outstanding with high return achieved at
relatively low risk. Adverse incentives are created to the extent that managers are compensated
for ex post performance either directly in the form of an incentive fee, or indirectly in terms of a
fee calculated on an asset base grossed up by the amount of performance-chasing inflow. For this
reason informationless trading may be rational in a delegated fund management context where
7See Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999) for a discussion of the institutional
environment of hedge funds and their relationship to the 1940 Act. 
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agents are compensated on the basis of observable short term performance. Whatever its
motivation, it remains true that informationless trading can be dangerous to one’s financial
health.
How prevalent is informationless trading? The Investment Company Act of 1940 limits the
ability of US public funds to use leverage and derivative instruments to execute such trades.
Similar restrictions in ERISA also apply to private US pension funds. Hedge funds by definition
are not limited to the restrictions of the Investment Company Act of 1940. However there is
limited disclosure and little reliable information to judge whether or not such methods are
employed, except in the case of a blow out, when all is revealed7. But by then it is too late. 
By contrast, the Australian case is interesting not only because public funds there are free to use
derivative instruments (subject to certain constraints), but also because there exists a unique and
otherwise inaccessible data set containing daily data on transactions and holdings for many of
the largest public equity funds operating in that country. In this paper we examine this data to
find out how prevalent informationless trading might be, and develop procedures that might be
used to develop early warning systems to identify informationless trading when it occurs.
Section 2 of the paper describes patterns of informationless trading and the experimental design
used to identify it. Section 3 reviews the database of Australian equity fund holdings and
transactions used in this study, while Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
62. Informationless Trading
“Informationless investing” is a term used by Weisman (2002) to describe a zero net investment
public information portfolio strategy designed to yield a Sharpe Ratio in excess of the
benchmark. Such a strategy can be implemented by borrowing to invest in the benchmark while
simultaneously establishing positions in derivative securities written upon the benchmark.
Alternatively it can be implemented by active trading that leads to similar payoffs. Examples of
informationless trading include, but are not limited to, short volatility trades and St. Petersburg
investing, otherwise known as doubling.
In their important paper, GISW establish the properties of zero net investment portfolio
strategies that maximize the strategy Sharpe ratio. Figure 1 illustrates the return to such a
strategy as a function of the return on the benchmark for the special case where the benchmark is
LogNormal with parameters :=15%, F=.15% and short interest rate 5% given an annual holding
period. They observe that for this example the Sharpe ratio is .748 as opposed to the Sharpe ratio
of the benchmark which is .631.   GISW observe that this portfolio strategy is attainable where
there is a continuum of puts and calls traded. However, a close approximation can be made with
just one call and one put, as illustrated in Figure 2. This short volatility strategy has a Sharpe
ratio of .743. 
These results show that a common unhedged short volatility strategy of a type reported to have
been used by Long Term Capital Management can generate Sharpe ratios in excess of the
benchmark using only public information. One interpretation of this result is the common
8This result can be demonstrated by showing that no out of the money calls or puts held
long will increase the Sharpe ratio over that of a LogNormal benchmark. In particular,
implementing portfolio insurance using put replication must lead to a reduction in the Sharpe
ratio (details available on request). In private communication, Jon Ingersoll has proved that the
same result holds in general assuming complete markets.
9Agarwal and Naik (2003) show that many hedge fund returns can be characterized by
benchmark positions supplemented by short positions in out of the money options.
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understanding that one should not use Sharpe ratios where portfolio returns are skewed (in this
case, left skewed). However, the same problem afflicts the Jensen alpha measure. GISW show
that if there exists an informationless portfolio strategy that maximizes the Sharpe ratio, in a
complete market this portfolio can be levered to generate an arbitrarily large Jensen alpha.
From the numerical example provided in GISW one is tempted to conclude that the portfolio that
maximizes the Sharpe ratio (and leads to an unbounded Jensen alpha) is a concave strategy.
GISW observe that this further result requires that the representative agent has a utility function
that displays diminishing absolute risk aversion. This assumption is implicit in applying the
Black Scholes formula to price the benchmark options. With this assumption, it is possible to
demonstrate a somewhat stronger result. No globally convex informationless portfolio strategy
can generate Sharpe ratios in excess of the benchmark.8 This result suggests a simple empirical
procedure based on a variant of the Treynor Mazuy (1966) procedure. If the quadratic term in the
Treynor Mazuy regression is positive we cannot attribute a positive alpha or favorable Sharpe
ratio to the use of informationless portfolio procedures9. In other words, in a regression of the
form
10See, for example, Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997), Chen, Jegadeesh and
Wermers (2000) and Wermers (2000). For an application in the Australian context, see Pinnuck
(2003).
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where is positive we should expect that  should be positive consistent with market timing
ability.
However, this is at best a very weak test of whether managers use informationless trading. On
the one hand, while concave informationless trading strategies generate positive alphas, we
cannot rule out the possibility that informed trading may also yield concave strategies and
positive alpha. Long Term Capital Management believed that the short volatility strategy was
justified because in their view the options they wrote were overvalued, but difficult to hedge
(Lowenstein 2000). On the other hand, if a manager were actually in the business of maximizing
alpha through informationless trading, we may not observe sufficient tail region observations to
estimate the quadratic term in the Treynor Mazuy regressions with sufficient precision to
conclude that the trading strategy was in fact concave. This is a limitation that results from only
considering return information. Holdings data is generally available for US mutual funds only on
a quarterly basis. While some very interesting work has been completed using this data10, fund
managers and pension fund trustees typically have much more information on holdings and
transactions and are not typically restricted to examining the series of fund returns.
Access to data on holdings and transactions would allow more powerful tests of whether traders
are engaging in informationless trading. One simple test would be to examine whether any
derivative positions held by the trader are concavity increasing or decreasing. Obviously, a short
11“I felt no elation at this success. I was determined to win back the losses. And as the
spring wore on, I traded harder and harder, risking more and more. I was well down, but
increasingly sure that my doubling up and doubling up would pay off ... I redoubled my
exposure. The risk was that the market could crumble down, but on this occasion it carried on
upwards ... As the market soared in July [1993] my position translated from a £6 million loss
back into glorious profit. I was so happy that night I didn’t think I’d ever go through that kind of
tension again. I’d pulled back a large position simply by holding my nerve ... but first thing on
Monday morning I found that I had to use the 88888 account again ... it became an addiction.”
(Leeson, 1996, pp.63-64). Such behavior might be rational in a context where the trader believes
their trades are sufficiently large to move the markets in the desired direction. Leeson (1996)
certainly believed this was the case, but maintains that the strategy failed through frontrunning. 
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volatility position which is simultaneously short unhedged out of the money calls and puts would
increase concavity of the pattern of payoffs. More generally, concavity would increase whenever
the number of puts held short exceeds the number of calls held long. However, as noted before,
we cannot rule out the possibility that the trader is trading on the basis of information. He or she
may believe that volatility is about to fall, or may feel that the securities being traded are
mispriced in an environment (such as the 1998 Russian bond example) where the derivatives
held short are difficult to hedge.
One source of concave payoff distributions that is difficult to attribute to informed trading is the
familiar doubling or St. Petersburg trading example. Such a trading pattern is characterized by
increasing investment in the risky security on a loss so as to recoup past losses on a favorable
market outcome. All investors who follow this strategy will face ruin in the long term, and we
must resort to behavioral arguments to explain this behavior. Nevertheless, on a short term basis
it gives the appearance of superior performance. The evidence suggests that this pattern of
trading is descriptive of the behavior of Nicholas Leeson at Barings (Brown and Steenbeek
2001)11.
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To illustrate this point, consider the simple binomial process depicted in Figure 3. The initial
investment of is financed by a loan equal to , and an initial hurdle or highwatermark  of
zero. After one period, should the market fall, the net worth of the investor falls to
which is less than the period 1 highwatermark . To recoup this loss, the
trader increases the investment in the risky security by borrowing an amount equal to and
investing the proceeds. With each loss, the investment in the risky security rises, until finally the
market rises, allowing the trader to achieve the target return. At that point the trader liquidates
the position and settles the margin account, reestablishing his initial position .
It is easy to see that on any loss, a doubler will trade an amount equal to
where the first term accounts for past losses, and the second term reestablishes his position in the
security. So long as the margin account is settled, the strategy has low risk and a return in excess
of cash. Of course the positions grow exponentially with each trading loss and with probability
one will exceed any finite capital limitation as the number of trading cycles becomes large. It is
this aspect of doubling strategies that is most troubling. 
To give a numerical illustration, consider the previous example from GISW where the value of
11
the benchmark evolves as a lognormal process with instantaneous mean per annum,
volatility  per annum and an annualized risk free rate of 5%. Using a 24 period binomial
approximation to the annual lognormal distribution of benchmark values, it is possible to
determine the distribution of terminal wealth for doubling and for other informationless trading
strategies. Since the doubling strategy is path dependent, there will be a range of terminal wealth
for any given benchmark return. In Figure 4 we show the relationship between annual returns to
the doubling strategy and the corresponding returns to the benchmark. While there is a range of
possible returns to a doubling strategy, these returns are a concave function of benchmark returns
and there is the chance of significant losses. The magnitude of the losses depress the Sharpe ratio
considerably, so that the doubling strategy for this example has a Sharpe ratio of only .0463,
relative to an annual holding period Sharpe ratio of .6983. It might appear that maximizing the
Sharpe ratio cannot be a motivation for doubling. However, most fund managers who achieve a
return of less than -200% of their initial position would be fired immediately. Managers who
survive (and 99.61% of them do in this example on an annual basis), achieve a much higher
Sharpe ratio of 1.9622 (the Sharpe ratio of the benchmark is .7062 given those market conditions
that allow the doubler to survive).
The challenge is to devise early warning signals that will alert investors and fund managers to
patterns of doubling trading that might otherwise be obscured by the substantial alphas and
Sharpe ratios that appear to be generated by such trading. The model of doubling trades is
captured by the expression
12
where  is a dummy variable indicating whether the highwatermark has been reached (
when , zero otherwise) ,  is the value of the security position on
a loss,  is the basis in that security position,
and  is a measure of the gain once the highwatermark is reached. In the
empirical work, we assume that the highwatermark evolves as  with .
The coefficients ,
given the trading model described above, whereas  if we assume that the trader sells
off any trading gains. The constants a and b4 and error term account for the average initial
position of the trader, and any non-doubling trading patterns.
It is important to note that this empirical representation of trading is consistent with the
predictions of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) which would have agents
gambling on losses by increasing position size when losses occur and the value of the position is
under the highwatermark, while at the same time realizing gains when above this target (
). It is weakly consistent with the disposition effect (Odean 1998) which while
12Frino, Johnstone and Zheng (2004) replicate Odean’s (1998) methodology and find
evidence consistent with the disposition hypothesis explaining the pattern of trading in the
Sydney Futures Exchange.
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predicting that agents realize gains, suggests that agents simply hold positions on a loss12.
In summary, while concave payoff distributions are consistent with informationless trading, such
evidence is not dispositive. Informed trading can also generate concave payoff distributions. Net
short positions in out of the money calls and puts are equally consistent with informed trading
where the underlying contracts are difficult or impossible to hedge. However, concave strategies
when combined with trading patterns consistent with St. Petersburg trading would increase the
concern that the trader is in fact engaging in informationless trading. The question is how
widespread this pattern of trading really is among active traders.
3. Data
This study uses a unique database of daily transactions and periodic holdings of 40 (includes 1
small cap fund) actively managed institutional Australian equity funds in the period 2 January
1995 to 28 June 2002 (subject to data availability for particular funds). The data is sourced from
the Portfolio Analytics Database, and the sample excludes passive equity funds (index and
enhanced) and small-cap equity funds benchmarked.  The data, provided under strict conditions
of confidentiality, contains the daily portfolio holdings and trade information of either the largest
(and where relevant) second largest investment products in Australian equities offered to
institutional investors (i.e. pension funds).  While the database includes all transactions in equity
stocks, futures contracts and options securities, this study provides an evaluation of trading
13“Most successful” in terms of assets under management (as of December 2001).
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performance related to equity securities.
The database was constructed with the support of Mercer Investment Consulting, whereby
individual requests for data were sent electronically to all the major investment managers who
operated in Australia between September and November 2001.  Invitations were sent to 45 fund
managers, and the total number of participating institutions who provided data was 37 (as at 30
June 2002).  Managers were requested to provide information for their largest pooled active
Australian equity funds (where appropriate) open to institutional investors.  The term 'largest'
was defined as the marked-to-market valuation of assets under management as at 31 December
2001, and was used as an indicative means of identifying portfolios that were truly representative
of the investment manager.  Given the data request procedure employed, and also that this
information is not generally available to any organization, the decision to request only the largest
equity fund represented a trade-off between maximizing the chances of cooperation from the
manager, as well a consideration that the number of pooled institutional pooled funds per asset
class is very small, and in a number of cases there is only one product available to wholesale
investors. The resulting sample is a representative selection of some of the most successful
equity funds in Australia13.
For this study we examine managed Australian equity funds.  Accordingly, the number of
participating managers employed in this sample provides coverage of 26 individual investment
organizations, where these firms (in aggregate) manage more than 60 percent of total
14 Sourced from market statistics provided by Rainmaker Information.
15In another study using the same database, Gallagher and Looi (2003) gain insight into
the extent of the survivorship and selection bias by comparing the performance of the data
15
institutional assets in the industry.14 The remaining 11 managers not included in the sample are
removed due to either the back-office systems of the managers not permitting a complete
extraction of both the relevant holdings and transactions data, or due to the managers offering
exclusive index fund management services.  Our study also relies on stock price information that
is sourced from the ASX Stock Exchange Automated Trading System (SEATS) as an
independent source of stock holding valuations which permitted cross-checking across the
managers.  The ASX SEATS data was provided by SIRCA, and includes all trade information
for stocks listed on the ASX.
Due to the nature of the collection procedure, several data issues are likely to arise - survivorship
and selection bias.  Survivorship bias occurs when a sample only contains data from funds that
have continued to exist through until the collection date of this sample period.  As a
consequence, if data from failed funds are not included in the sample, conclusions drawn from
the pool of "successful" funds having survived the sample period will overstate overall
performance. The second form of bias in managed fund studies is selection bias.  This occurs
when the fund sample contains data that has been selected for inclusion based on specific
criteria.  In this case, it is possible that managers managing multiple funds may present
information for their most successful funds, skewing the sample as a result.  Since the focus of
this paper is on the trading behavior of the “most successful” Australian equity funds, we do not
believe this represents a significant issue for our study15.
sample against that of the population of investment managers which also includes non-surviving
funds.  Over the entire sample window, the average outperformance of the average manager over
the ASX/S&P 200 index is 1.78 percent with a standard deviation of 1.39 percent. For our
sample the mean manager outperformed the average manager, weighted by manager years, by
0.34 percent per annum. While this indicates that the sample outperforms the industry, the
magnitude of the outperformance is low compared to the dispersion of performance across
management firms.
16
In terms of market representation by funds under management (at 31 December 2001), the
sample includes the largest 10 managers, 8 from the next 10, 6 from the managers ranked 21-30,
and the remaining managers are outside the largest 30 managers. In terms of investment style,
the equity funds are partitioned based on the manager’s self-reported style that is specific to the
Australian market.  These style classifications are ‘value’, ‘growth’, ‘growth-at-a-reasonable
price’ (GARP), ‘style neutral’ and ‘other’.  The latter style classification includes managers that
do not emphasize a specific investment style (excluding style neutral).  In terms of the style
representation across the sample, most funds operate using GARP (13) and value styles (10), and
five and six funds follow growth and style neutral strategies, respectively. We also include three
index/enhanced index style funds.  Overall, our sample is highly representative of the Australian
investment management industry in terms of manager size, the number of institutions operating
in the financial services industry, and on the basis of investment style.
4. Results
4.1 Return based measures of informationless trading
In Table 1 we present the summary statistics of the funds. Within this group there is a
considerable variation in size, number of stocks held and turnover, with some significant
16Results were almost identical using a four factor alpha incorporating Australian
domestic market, size, book to market and momentum factors.
17One caveat to these results is the fact that Australian equity funds did not customarily
report daily unit values until two years ago. The daily and weekly returns were therefore
computed indirectly from records of daily holdings accounting for transactions matched up to
total returns as computed in the SEATS database.
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outliers, notably funds 1 and 31. Fund 1 is a very active trader, while find 31 does very little
trading.
Tables 2 and 3 presents the results of this trading activity over the period of data for each of the
funds. Almost every fund records positive Jensen alpha measures relative to the Australian All
Ordinaries accumulation market index16, and in more than half of the cases these measures are
statistically significant on a daily or weekly return measurement interval17. In addition five out of
the 40 funds (in the case of daily return measures) or one fund (in the case of weekly return
measures) showed some evidence of successful market timing. In these cases the quadratic term
in the Treynor Mazuy regression was positive and statistically significant.
On the other hand, almost all of the funds exhibit negative skewness, and in more than half of the
cases, the Treynor Mazuy coefficient was negative. In fact, there were more cases of statistically
significantly negative coefficients than of significant positive coefficients on a daily or a weekly
return measurement interval. There are a number of possible interpretations of this result.
Perhaps these funds are market timers who can’t? If that is so, it is hard to explain the positive
alphas and Sharpe ratios that are large relative to the corresponding All Ordinaries benchmark.
Perhaps the results are an artefact of the Treynor Mazuy measure?
18
We verified this result using a modification of the Henriksson and Merton (1981) where instead
of regressing excess return on excess return on the market index and the payoff of an at-the-
money call, we incorporate the payoff of an at-the-money put, to capture the attribute of
informationless trading that leads to negative skew and extreme left tail outcomes. In each case,
the results matched the results obtained from inspection of the Treynor Mazuy coefficients. 
It is tempting to conclude from this evidence that a minority of successful Australian equity
funds use informationless trading to boost reported performance measures. However, these
results are equally consistent with the alternative explanation that the results are simply due to
chance. Bollen and Busse (2001) suggest that the non-Normality of daily returns implies that the
resulting coefficients should be interpreted with care. Since the test statistics are fat tailed, we
should not be surprised that we can reject the null hypothesis of zero nonlinear terms at about
twice the size of the test. In addition, the results may simply be an artefact of the well understood
stale pricing phenomenon. Since most of the funds studied limit investments to issues traded on
the Australian Stock Exchange or on the over the counter market, when losses are realized, they
can be relatively large given that many securities are illiquid and trade infrequently. In this
context, the return-based evidence does not support the conjecture that many or most funds
resort to informationless trading to augment reported performance statistics. The simple return
based measures of informationless trading are simply not powerful enough to draw such a
conclusion.
18While only funds 17 and 31 recorded any futures contracts in month end security
holdings, in each case the futures positions constituted a little more than half of the fund asset
value.
19Unfortunately, our database does not include complete option pricing details, so it is not
possible to compute accurate value weights of the various option positions
19
4.2 Derivatives positions consistent with informationless trading
While Australian managed funds are permitted to take positions in derivative securities, less than
half of the funds in our sample established significant option positions and only two funds held
significant positions in futures contracts18. For each holding date in the sample, we counted the
number of positions classified as short volatility (out of the money calls and puts held short),
long volatility (out of the money calls and puts held long), and various other short and long put
and call positions19. We also classified the positions according to the extent to which they
increased or decreased the concavity of a trading strategy based on the underlying security. Very
few options were held by funds either long or short where there was not also a position in the
underlying asset.
In Table 4 we show that while only a minority of option positions outstanding at month end
could be characterized as short volatility of the underlying security, 72 percent of the option
positions had the effect of increasing concavity. Of particular interest is the fact that almost all of
the open month end option positions maintained by the enhanced index products were in fact
concavity increasing. The fact that most of the option positions are unhedged short positions
suggests that the funds are in fact attempting to improve reported performance numbers by
informationless trades. This is particularly the case for the enhanced index products, where the
20Here we make the simplifying assumption that the parameters of the model dependent
on measures of daily risk free rate and expected return are constant through the estimation
period.
21We attempt to control for involuntary liquidation of fund assets and net fund inflow by
excluding from daily transactions the total net inflow to the fund apportioned according to the
percentage of the fund invested in each asset as of the previous month end holding period. The
results were not sensitive to this adjustment, and were almost identical using the raw value of
transactions as the dependent variable.
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enhancement appears to be short volatility trading. However, these positions represent a portfolio
of options each one an option on an individual security. Only fund 4 held index options or
options on index futures. This fund had an open short position in one Australian All Ordinaries
index call option contract from December 1998 to March 2000. Thus while the evidence is
consistent with volatility trades at the individual security level, it is not necessarily consistent
with informationless trading at the level of the aggregate fund.
4.3 Patterns of trading consistent with informationless trading
Table 5 presents results based on the regression model presented in the previous Section, applied
to daily measures of trading in individual stocks20. We measure trading as the total value of
transactions less a passive apportionment of net fund inflow21. In almost of the cases studied, the
signs of the coefficients are consistent with an informationless trading hypothesis, and in a
quarter of the cases we see statistically significant patterns of doubling or St. Petersburg trading:
when funds are currently under the previous high water mark of trading, they trade more the
greater the original cost of the security position, and the lower the current market value of the
position. In ten percent of the cases studied, the level of trading by the funds that are underwater
22See Gallagher and Looi (2003)
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is significantly affected by the level of the high watermark. On the other hand these funds
purchase to re-establish their position once above the high water mark, but any gains beyond the
high water mark are promptly liquidated. In many cases this pattern is particularly striking as the
funds liquidate almost dollar for dollar with any gain above the high water mark.
4.4 Informationless trading at the security level and fund level
In the case of derivative security holdings, we see evidence of informationless trading at the
level of individual securities, but not at the level of the aggregate fund. There is no evidence that
funds systematically use index options to artificially augment performance numbers, contrary to
the conjecture of GISW. The evidence on security trading is similar. There is evidence of
doubling at the security level but not at the fund level. If the doubling were the result of a
conscious decision on the part of management to augment performance statistics in the hope of
attracting new fund inflow, we should see doubling at the aggregate fund level. In other words
we should expect to see the fund increasing the equity allocation as the value of the fund falls
below the benchmark determined by the past maximum equity value. The results in Table 6
show that there is very little evidence of doubling once the high water mark is defined in terms
of aggregate fund performance. In fact, the allocation of funds to the equity sector is strongly
associated with fund value, which is consistent with momentum trading rather than the anti-
momentum trades22 typical in doubling situations. 
23See Elton and Gruber (2004) for a discussion of this issue.
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How do we reconcile this evidence? Almost all of the funds in the study are managed in a
decentralized fashion, where individual managers form part of a team that is compensated in the
form of an annual bonus based on performance. Part of the explanation may lie in this delegation
of fund management responsibility23. Once we aggregate according to style and management
characteristics (Table 7) there is strong evidence that certain fund characteristics are associated
with doubling behaviors. For example, we see that the evidence of doubling is concentrated in
one fund style of management (GARP) and in funds that are large either in terms of assets under
management or in terms of number of securities held. It is more prevalent where there is
decentralized ownership by banks or insurance companies, where senior staff do not hold
significant ownership positions and where these staff are compensated instead in the form of an
annual bonus. This result is broadly consistent with the theoretical and empirical results of
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) which highlight the
adverse  consequences for the long term objectives of principals where agents are compensated
based on observable short term performance.
However, this cannot be a complete explanation for these results. While fund management in
Australia is typically 'team oriented', the head of equities as the leader of the team, bears ultimate
responsibility. The extent to which the results are team driven or individually driven obviously
depends on unobservable (to us) factors including the head's personality and the firm's internal
management processes. In fact, the results are also consistent with simple behavioral
explanations. Note for example that where the evidence of doubling is strongest, the funds tend
24 “We decided to redouble our efforts around a few stocks that we knew were loved, just
loved by institutions, betting that near the end of the quarter they would come and embrace their
favorites and 'walk them up,' or take them higher in order to magnify performance.  Pretty much
everyone in the business knows that there are some funds that live for the end of the quarter.
They know they can 'juice' their performance by taking up big slugs of stock in the last few days
of a quarter” Cramer (2002) p. 147. In context, like other doublers, Cramer believes that
doubling down provides the necessary market pressure to move the market in the desired
direction. We are indebted to Jeffrey Wurgler for this reference.
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to liquidate gains on a dollar for dollar basis (the coefficient is indistinguishable from -1.0). This
is strongly consistent with both the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and
disposition (Odean 1998) hypotheses. In fact, there may be an alternative behavioral explanation
for the fact that doubling occurs at the individual security level but not at the aggregate fund
level. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) document that decision makers narrowly frame decisions
under uncertainty to one gamble at a time, where in this case each gamble represents a position
taken on an individual security or security derivative contract. This might explain an observed
tendency of fund managers to double on individual stocks in an attempt to window dress the
portfolio on quarterly review dates24. An important recent paper by Barberis, Huang and Thaler
(2003) suggests that this narrow framing behavior is sufficient to explain limited equity market
participation and the scale of the observed equity premium. In this context the evidence for
doubling in large and decentralized decision making environments might be consistent with
looser management controls in this organizational setting.
5. Conclusion
The recent paper by Goetzmann et al. (2002) suggests that fund managers subject to a
performance review have an adverse incentive to engage in informationless trades that have the
unfortunate attribute that they can expose the fund investor to significant downside risk.
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Weismann suggests that this behavior is endemic in managed investment funds and particularly
in hedge funds. We examine this conjecture using a unique database of daily transactions and
holdings by a set of forty successful Australian equity managers. High frequency holdings and
transaction data is not typically available to academic observers, and our results suggest that
greater transparency might be an important objective for both regulators and fund management.
In particular, we find that while there is only limited return-based evidence of informationless
trading, holdings and transactions data reveal that the funds are indeed trading in an
informationless manner. Interestingly enough this evidence comes from holdings and
transactions of individual securities within each fund, rather than the holdings and transactions
of the fund taken as a whole. We observe that this result is consistent with both the principal
agent literature as well as the recent behavioral literature.
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Figure 1: Sharpe Ratio Maximizing Portfolio Strategy for a LogNormal Benchmark
This figure gives the return on a maximum Sharpe Ratio portfolio strategy as a function of the
return on the benchmark, assuming that the benchmark is distributed as LogNormal with
parameters :=15%, F=.15% and short interest rate 5% given an annual holding period. The
Sharpe Ratio of this strategy is .748 as opposed to the Sharpe Ratio of the benchmark which is
.631. This figure is taken from Goetzmann et al.(2002).
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Figure 2: Short Volatility Strategy for a LogNormal Benchmark
This figure gives the return on a short volatility strategy constructed by holding 100 units of the
benchmark, short 258 out of the money puts at a strike of 0.88 and short 77 out of the money
calls at a strike of 1.12, as a function of the return on the benchmark. The benchmark is
distributed as LogNormal with parameters :=15%, F=.15% and short interest rate 5% given an
annual holding period. The Sharpe Ratio of this strategy is .743 as opposed to the Sharpe Ratio
of the benchmark which is .631. These results are taken from Goetzmann et al.(2002).
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Figure 4 Informationless trading strategy returns
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of funds studied
Fund 
Investment 
Style Fund
Number of 
observations
Average 
number of 
securities 
held
Average 
number of 
trades per 
month
Average 
annual 
turnover
GARP 1 427 108 66.1 20.69
2 1515 78 161.6 0.79
3 1514 66 280 1.18
4 859 231 294.3 1.07
5 1897 104 150.9 0.87
6 633 54 109.4 0.42
7 425 47 114.2 1.39
8 464 48 68.5 0.65
9 425 49 118.5 1.39
10 107 30 31 1.62
11 505 112 117.3 1.44
12 107 47 67.2 0.86
13 887 87 82.6 0.16
Growth 14 427 31 90.8 0.35
15 1954 38 3.9 0.26
16 1954 35 8.2 0.34
17 1931 50 41.4 0.85
18 1339 51 365.7 6.4
Neutral 19 1011 126 287.1 0.64
20 632 62 97.3 2
21 1009 45 43.2 6.8
22 777 31 76.7 0.99
23 1887 40 22.4 0.51
24 1092 37 21.6 0.49
Other 25 1506 100 122.2 0.69
26 797 68 71.1 0.84
27 837 27 36 1.27
Value 28 2020 87 170.6 0.91
29 1029 96 76.3 0.5
30 1836 74 71.6 1.68
31 528 41 22.4 0.09
32 365 56 45.8 0.92
33 884 36 39.3 0.61
34 1049 72 87.2 0.81
35 884 32 32 0.59
36 272 31 26.3 0.62
37 428 61 296.1 0.02
38 778 271 231.3 0.34
39 1515 308 187 0.33
40 1897 340 227.6 0.23
Passive/ 
Enhanced 
Table 2: Characteristics of fund daily returns
Fund 
Investment 
Style Fund Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Sharpe 
Ratio Alpha FF Alpha Beta Skewness Kurtosis Curvature
Adjusted 
Henriksson 
Merton
GARP 1 0.03% 0.77% 0.0388 0.02% 0.02% 0.82 -1.2404 14.9989 -0.02714 -0.15502
(1.97) (2.25) (-2.84) (-5.42)
2 0.06% 0.92% 0.0644 0.03% 0.03% 1.06 -0.4130 7.4423 0.00623 0.05635
(7.03) (7.51) (0.65) (3.49)
3 0.06% 0.92% 0.0607 0.03% 0.03% 1.04 -0.5023 9.1313 0.00119 0.02735
(5.10) (5.40) (0.19) (1.37)
4 0.03% 0.78% 0.0447 0.02% 0.02% 0.96 -0.4222 5.7012 0.02392 0.09717
(2.80) (3.38) (2.39) (3.50)
5 0.01% 0.82% 0.0146 -0.01% 0.00% 0.90 -0.5076 12.5909 -0.00326 -0.02140
(-1.17) (-0.52) (-0.21) (-0.73)
6 0.05% 0.87% 0.0520 0.03% 0.03% 0.90 -0.8433 10.8784 -0.01296 -0.09292
(1.68) (1.84) (-0.43) (-1.36)
7 0.02% 0.77% 0.0310 0.01% 0.00% 0.96 -0.8997 8.3456 -0.01130 -0.02385
(0.68) (-0.12) (-1.68) (-0.50)
8 0.02% 0.88% 0.0262 0.00012 5.12E-05 1.06 -1.0570 9.1225 0.01140 0.04749
(1.49) (0.65) (1.11) (1.67)
9 0.02% 0.77% 0.0310 0.01% 0.00% 0.96 -0.9085 8.3978 -0.01196 -0.02694
(0.68) (-0.11) (-1.78) (-0.56)
10 0.02% 1.09% 0.0152 -0.01% -0.01% 1.09 -1.7335 10.4898 -0.00867 -0.02349
(-0.56) (-0.60) (-0.53) (-0.32)
11 0.02% 0.70% 0.0312 0.01% 0.01% 0.96 -0.8464 8.6271 -0.00039 0.04418
(1.02) (1.23) (-0.07) (1.18)
12 0.04% 0.72% 0.0580 0.03% 0.05% 0.63 -1.9786 19.5896 -0.14020 -0.51645
(1.30) (1.81) (-5.42) (-4.97)
13 0.04% 0.92% 0.0382 0.01% 0.02% 0.91 -0.0203 17.9927 0.00837 -0.00143
(0.83) (1.10) (0.35) (-0.02)
Growth 14 0.03% 0.89% 0.0376 0.01% 0.01% 1.01 -0.4834 6.4289 -0.00277 -0.01507
(1.93) (1.77) (-0.24) (-0.73)
15 0.03% 0.89% 0.0386 0.01% 0.02% 1.01 -0.3788 9.0964 -0.00240 -0.01227
(1.85) (2.22) (-0.53) (-0.51)
16 0.04% 0.84% 0.0457 0.02% 0.02% 0.94 -0.4793 10.3912 -0.00856 -0.04705
(2.50) (2.73) (-1.34) (-1.81)
17 0.03% 0.84% 0.0319 0.00% 0.01% 1.00 -0.6617 9.9290 -0.00981 -0.05632
(1.03) (1.59) (-5.48) (-3.46)
18 0.06% 0.96% 0.0595 0.00038 0.000392 1.08 -0.4794 8.3978 0.00306 0.03200
(6.00) (6.22) (0.53) (1.49)
Neutral 19 0.04% 0.86% 0.0436 0.02% 0.02% 1.01 -0.4056 5.5247 0.00849 0.03571
(3.61) (3.66) (3.22) (2.24)
20 0.07% 0.86% 0.0767 0.05% 0.05% 1.03 -0.5000 5.9904 0.02841 0.13189
(7.21) (7.26) (7.17) (5.10)
21 0.03% 0.93% 0.0305 0.00% 0.01% 1.07 -0.3073 4.6229 0.01645 0.03026
(0.67) (0.80) (2.03) (1.10)
22 0.04% 0.88% 0.0465 0.02% 0.02% 1.01 -0.9458 8.3384 -0.01060 -0.05741
(1.79) (2.02) (-0.75) (-1.36)
23 0.05% 0.81% 0.0571 0.02% 0.03% 0.95 -0.5645 11.5717 -0.00518 -0.03806
(3.83) (4.58) (-0.74) (-1.88)
24 0.04% 0.97% 0.0418 0.02% 0.02% 1.04 -0.4575 8.2892 0.00291 0.00184
(2.60) (2.81) (0.45) (0.08)
Other 25 0.03% 0.86% 0.0405 0.00011 9.84E-05 0.98 -0.6130 10.6272 -0.00271 -0.01078
(2.29) (1.98) (-0.99) (-0.62)
26 0.01% 0.82% 0.0105 0.01% 0.01% 1.03 -0.8378 8.3886 -0.00136 0.00166
(1.80) (1.45) (-0.30) (0.08)
27 0.04% 0.84% 0.0484 0.02% 0.02% 1.00 -0.8225 8.0211 -0.01241 -0.06778
(2.47) (2.42) (-2.26) (-1.71)
Value 28 0.02% 0.63% 0.0256 4.8E-05 9.96E-05 0.66 -1.0274 14.4896 -0.00002 -0.00306
(0.68) (1.41) (0.00) (-0.12)
29 0.03% 0.83% 0.0329 0.02% 0.01% 1.01 -0.3649 5.8822 0.00873 0.03656
(3.64) (3.45) (3.07) (2.30)
30 0.01% 0.87% 0.0096 -0.01% -0.01% 0.78 -0.6887 9.9624 -0.00760 -0.08714
(-0.69) (-0.41) (-0.49) (-1.73)
31 0.06% 0.67% 0.0934 0.05% 0.05% 0.85 -1.2474 12.3272 -0.04023 -0.08921
(4.47) (4.05) (-2.60) (-1.79)
Table 2: Characteristics of fund daily returns (continued)
Fund 
Investment 
Style Fund Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Sharpe 
Ratio Alpha FF Alpha Beta Skewness Kurtosis Curvature
Adjusted 
Henriksson 
Merton
Value 32 0.07% 0.73% 0.0897 0.06% 0.06% 0.89 -1.0073 9.0071 -0.01428 -0.00860
(4.17) (4.00) (-1.60) (-0.14)
33 0.05% 0.80% 0.0566 0.03% 0.04% 0.82 -0.1878 4.6342 0.02126 0.08129
(2.09) (2.86) (1.25) (1.58)
34 0.04% 0.83% 0.0431 0.03% 0.03% 0.98 -0.2947 5.2878 0.01246 0.03890
(3.84) (3.96) (2.18) (1.53)
35 0.10% 0.96% 0.1044 0.09% 0.08% 0.60 -0.9203 18.6309 -0.11822 -0.44607
(3.20) (2.55) (-4.09) (-4.48)
36 0.07% 0.77% 0.0928 0.00062 0.000648 0.79 -1.5887 11.7619 0.03455 0.15352
(2.24) (2.31) (0.53) (1.47)
37 0.02% 0.61% 0.0292 0.00% 0.01% 0.63 -1.2832 14.5898 -0.01127 -0.07527
(0.70) (1.34) (-1.80) (-3.00)
Passive/ 38 0.06% 0.82% 0.0756 0.04% 0.04% 1.01 -0.5575 6.1699 0.02026 0.09232
Enhanced (12.73) (11.75) (5.80) (7.76)
39 0.05% 0.86% 0.0621 0.03% 0.03% 1.00 -0.4548 9.5136 0.00567 0.04460
(10.45) (11.28) (1.61) (4.77)
40 0.02% 0.78% 0.0217 0.00% 0.00% 0.84 -0.4789 14.1571 -0.00077 -0.01551
(-0.32) (0.21) (-0.04) (-0.53)
Mean, Standard Deviation and Sharpe ratio are calculated on the basis of total daily fund returns. These data were 
constructed from records of daily holdings and transactions matched against the total returns recorded in the SEATS 
database, or as reported by the manager (typically for the last year of our sample), with short interest rate given by the 
holding period returns on 30 Day Treasury Notes (data from Reserve Bank of Australia). Alpha and beta are calculated 
relative to the corresponding ASX All Ordinaries index in excess of the short interest rate, expressed in percentage daily 
terms (t-values computed using the White correction for heteroskedasticity in parentheses). The curvature term corresponds 
to the quadratic term in the Treynor Mazuy model, while the Adjusted Henriksson Merton term corresponds to the coefficient 
on a put payoff (instead of the more usual call payoff) in the Henriksson Merton (1981) model
Table 3: Characteristics of fund weekly returns
Fund 
Investment 
Style Fund Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Sharpe 
Ratio Alpha FF Alpha Beta Skewness Kurtosis Curvature
Adjusted 
Henriksson 
Merton
GARP 1 0.19% 1.69% 0.1130 0.10% 0.10% 0.90 -0.4207 4.4203 -0.02116 -0.17138
(2.76) (2.76) (-2.69) (-2.68)
2 0.29% 1.91% 0.1527 0.16% 0.17% 1.08 -0.0213 3.4664 0.00924 0.07933
(7.20) (6.96) (1.25) (1.81)
3 0.27% 1.87% 0.1464 0.15% 0.15% 1.05 0.0016 3.8560 0.01249 0.08794
(5.33) (5.39) (1.29) (1.65)
4 0.15% 1.75% 0.0877 0.09% 0.10% 0.96 -0.1678 3.1175 0.00181 -0.00905
(2.41) (3.15) (0.23) (-0.13)
5 0.06% 1.73% 0.0369 -0.03% -0.02% 0.89 -0.0190 3.3010 -0.00222 -0.05756
(-0.74) (-0.54) (-0.17) (-0.68)
6 0.22% 1.97% 0.1110 0.15% 0.15% 0.99 -0.4793 3.8615 -0.05217 -0.36385
(2.19) (2.19) (-3.84) (-3.18)
7 0.13% 1.94% 0.0663 0.05% 0.05% 0.97 0.0106 4.5652 0.01087 0.07178
(0.71) (0.71) (0.90) (0.69)
8 0.10% 2.02% 0.0498 0.00049 -8.1E-05 1.04 -0.2767 3.4096 -0.01018 -0.08058
(1.19) (-0.21) (-1.26) (-1.20)
9 0.13% 1.94% 0.0660 0.04% 0.04% 0.97 0.0080 4.5793 0.01068 0.07102
(0.70) (0.70) (0.88) (0.68)
10 0.30% 2.68% 0.1121 0.10% 0.10% 1.07 -0.3568 2.7624 -0.00012 -0.05034
(0.97) (0.97) (-0.01) (-0.32)
11 0.06% 1.76% 0.0337 0.01% 0.01% 0.96 -0.0251 3.6446 -0.00227 0.01044
(0.36) (0.36) (-0.26) (0.14)
12 0.42% 1.68% 0.2481 0.39% 0.39% 0.63 -0.7387 6.9626 -0.02586 -0.23102
(3.19) (3.19) (-1.06) (-1.10)
13 0.17% 1.80% 0.0921 0.06% 0.06% 0.91 -0.5072 3.6330 -0.04303 -0.32124
(1.39) (1.39) (-5.48) (-4.63)
Growth 14 0.16% 1.92% 0.0851 0.05% 0.05% 1.07 -0.1255 3.3113 0.00366 0.05627
(1.86) (1.61) (0.51) (1.17)
15 0.17% 1.88% 0.0893 0.06% 0.07% 1.04 -0.0606 4.2179 -0.00362 -0.01879
(1.89) (2.10) (-0.26) (-0.29)
16 0.19% 1.80% 0.1053 0.09% 0.09% 0.97 -0.1656 4.4976 -0.02009 -0.13697
(2.49) (2.38) (-1.36) (-1.93)
17 0.13% 1.75% 0.0738 0.03% 0.04% 1.02 -0.1262 3.2494 -0.00367 -0.03494
(1.30) (1.84) (-0.55) (-0.82)
18 0.28% 2.00% 0.1379 0.00191 0.001944 1.10 -0.1965 3.1299 -0.00588 -0.01714
(5.83) (5.80) (-0.70) (-0.28)
Neutral 19 0.18% 1.90% 0.0934 0.06% 0.06% 1.02 -0.0622 3.4169 0.00804 0.03433
(2.51) (2.41) (1.26) (0.76)
20 0.22% 2.34% 0.0927 0.14% 0.14% 0.97 -0.0621 3.3963 -0.01806 -0.26002
(1.00) (1.00) (-0.65) (-1.11)
21 0.23% 2.02% 0.1148 0.12% 0.12% 1.01 -0.0320 3.2115 -0.00134 -0.02060
(2.51) (2.51) (-0.12) (-0.22)
22 0.19% 2.02% 0.0928 0.09% 0.10% 1.07 -0.4598 4.3506 -0.01612 -0.09391
(1.57) (1.92) (-1.04) (-0.96)
23 0.22% 1.69% 0.1329 0.11% 0.13% 0.97 -0.1145 3.4667 -0.00327 -0.05213
(4.10) (4.57) (-0.52) (-0.97)
24 0.20% 2.02% 0.0978 0.08% 0.09% 1.06 -0.2107 3.4761 -0.00865 -0.06695
(2.61) (2.76) (-0.90) (-1.16)
Other 25 0.17% 1.72% 0.1013 0.00063 0.000603 0.98 -0.1514 3.1595 0.00013 0.01232
(3.32) (2.91) (0.03) (0.34)
26 0.23% 1.83% 0.1283 0.23% 0.23% 1.01 -0.0652 3.0798 -0.00103 -0.01594
(6.61) (6.61) (-0.13) (-0.25)
27 0.19% 1.91% 0.1011 0.11% 0.11% 1.03 -0.2781 3.4311 -0.01209 -0.03784
(2.38) (2.38) (-1.11) (-0.43)
Value 28 0.08% 1.35% 0.0604 0.00026 0.000498 0.67 -0.2704 4.5473 -0.00875 -0.08471
(0.74) (1.49) (-0.80) (-1.27)
29 0.27% 1.83% 0.1479 0.22% 0.22% 1.00 0.0624 3.4488 0.01061 0.07278
(9.93) (9.93) (2.24) (1.80)
30 0.05% 1.84% 0.0252 -0.04% -0.04% 0.76 0.0740 4.2876 -0.02096 -0.19050
(-0.57) (-0.57) (-1.25) (-1.42)
31 0.29% 1.66% 0.1718 0.25% 0.19% 0.87 -0.4338 4.8583 -0.01832 -0.12174
(3.98) (2.95) (-1.19) (-1.14)
Table 3: Characteristics of fund weekly returns (continued)
Fund 
Investment 
Style Fund Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Sharpe 
Ratio Alpha FF Alpha Beta Skewness Kurtosis Curvature
Adjusted 
Henriksson 
Merton
Value 32 0.33% 1.83% 0.1775 0.31% 0.32% 0.90 -0.4401 3.1850 -0.01866 -0.14292
(4.01) (3.51) (-1.75) (-1.06)
33 0.37% 1.83% 0.2044 0.28% 0.28% 0.79 -0.0611 4.2555 -0.02440 -0.17048
(3.53) (3.53) (-1.52) (-1.23)
34 0.29% 1.83% 0.1582 0.25% 0.25% 0.98 0.0923 3.7466 0.01121 0.06200
(7.54) (7.54) (1.55) (1.01)
35 0.88% 2.39% 0.3686 0.83% 0.83% 0.43 1.2235 10.2456 -0.00605 0.10501
(4.81) (4.81) (-0.18) (0.36)
36 0.34% 1.89% 0.1815 0.29% 0.31% 0.90 -0.6252 5.1276 -0.02198 -0.18672
(3.02) (3.07) (-0.86) (-1.13)
37 0.09% 1.28% 0.0693 0.00026 0.000442 0.63 -0.4125 4.4588 -0.02025 -0.14773
(0.81) (1.30) (-1.35) (-2.37)
Passive/ 38 0.29% 1.81% 0.1621 0.18% 0.19% 1.00 -0.1799 3.0805 0.00456 0.02232
Enhanced (7.75) (8.21) (0.91) (0.50)
39 0.26% 1.75% 0.1499 0.14% 0.15% 1.01 -0.0252 3.4723 0.00987 0.06758
(11.21) (11.73) (1.64) (2.71)
40 0.09% 1.65% 0.0534 0.00% 0.01% 0.84 -0.0712 3.6454 -0.00522 -0.07595
(-0.07) (0.25) (-0.39) (-0.93)
Mean, Standard Deviation and Sharpe ratio are calculated on the basis of total week by week fund returns. These data 
were constructed from records of daily holdings and transactions matched against the total returns recorded in the SEATS 
database, or as reported by the manager (typically for the last year of our sample), with short interest rate given by the 
holding period returns on 30 Day Treasury Notes (data from Reserve Bank of Australia). Alpha and beta are calculated 
relative to the corresponding ASX All Ordinaries index in excess of the short interest rate, expressed in percentage daily 
terms (t-values computed using the White correction for heteroskedasticity in parentheses). The curvature term 
corresponds to the quadratic term in the Treynor Mazuy model, while the Adjusted Henriksson Merton term corresponds 
to the coefficient on a put payoff (instead of the more usual call payoff) in the Henriksson Merton (1981) model
Table 4: Fraction of open option positions by security
Fund 
Investment 
Style Fund
Short 
volatility
Long put 
Short call 
Short put 
Long call 
Long 
volatility
Short 
put 
Long 
put 
Short 
call Long call 
Concavity 
increasing
Concavity 
decreasing
Concavity 
neutral N
GARP 1 15.00% 61.67% 23.33% 100.00% 60
2 2.73% 2.50% 5.00% 1.36% 18.18% 10.23% 37.95% 22.05% 61.14% 36.36% 2.50% 440
3 3.64% 10.91% 12.73% 22.73% 50.00% 33.64% 62.73% 3.64% 110
4 4.52% 1.69% 17.23% 13.84% 7.91% 3.95% 12.71% 38.14% 29.38% 70.62% 354
5 17.65% 35.29% 47.06% 100.00% 17
6 100.00% 100.00% 11
11 50.00% 50.00% 100.00% 6
13 100.00% 100.00% 11
Growth 15 60.00% 40.00% 60.00% 40.00% 5
16 100.00% 100.00% 3
17 1.45% 1.45% 2.90% 13.04% 59.42% 21.74% 65.22% 34.78% 69
Neutral 21 45.89% 2.74% 2.05% 16.44% 32.19% 0.68% 95.89% 0.68% 3.42% 146
22 100.00% 100.00% 10
24 100.00% 100.00% 1
Value 31 15.14% 0.69% 0.92% 75.46% 7.80% 83.72% 14.45% 1.83% 436
33 35.00% 65.00% 35.00% 65.00% 20
Passive/ 38 11.27% 0.23% 1.88% 16.90% 64.32% 5.40% 94.37% 5.63% 426
Enhanced 39 29.35% 2.55% 4.06% 27.49% 0.35% 29.47% 6.73% 88.05% 9.40% 2.55% 862
13.39% 3.72% 4.45% 2.14% 15.53% 4.32% 40.27% 16.17% 72.01% 26.31% 1.67% 2987Total
In this table we count the total number of open option positions at each end of month holding date recorded in the Portfolio Analytics Database, where the 
underlying security is also held by the fund. Short volatility refers to positions where there are short puts and calls outstanding, whereas long volatility refers 
to positions where there are long puts and calls held. "Concavity increasing" positions arise whenever the number of puts is less than the negative of the 
number of calls. An example is short volatility, where both options are held in negative amounts. "Concavity decreasing positions arise where the number of 
puts is greater than the negative of the number of calls. "Concavity neutral" positions arise where the number of puts equals the negative of the number of 
calls.
Only fund 4 held index options or options on index futures. This fund had an open short position in one Australian All Ordinaries index call option contract 
from December 1998 to March 2000.
Table 5: Trade analysis regression - Individual securities
Fund 
Investment 
Style Fund Constant
Highwater 
mark
Value of 
Holdings Cost Basis
Above 
Highwater 
mark?
Value 
above 
highwater Rsq N
Durbin 
Watson 
Statistic
GARP 1 147549 0.1817 -0.1721 0.1383 -565440 -0.1325 0.0346 2496 2.313
(0.87) (2.55) (-2.39) (2.18) (-1.97) (-1.15)
2 67323 0.0167 -0.0240 0.0169 1115909 -1.0445 0.9313 5735 2.089
(1.31) (2.08) (-2.35) (2.06) (8.23) (-66.46)
3 102972 0.0201 -0.0215 0.0077 512267 -0.9916 0.8601 9383 1.719
(2.78) (3.02) (-2.85) (1.16) (6.68) (-118.02)
4 44670 0.0630 -0.0186 0.0104 -119797 0.0293 0.0154 2053 1.874
(1.70) (1.74) (-0.66) (0.42) (-2.65) (0.78)
5 19925 -0.0458 0.0128 -0.0239 3604 -0.4825 0.0225 4187 1.846
(2.23) (-2.87) (0.93) (-2.28) (0.19) (-8.17)
6 85789 0.0576 -0.0370 0.0504 54438 0.4459 0.0834 1798 1.636
(5.39) (0.70) (-0.74) (1.28) (1.97) (4.21)
7 -176151 0.3133 -0.4331 0.3374 -12560 0.3592 0.0884 751 1.713
(-4.46) (1.94) (-3.11) (2.85) (-0.14) (1.23)
8 -111215 0.0392 -0.0379 0.0348 228645 0.1263 0.0357 954 1.937
(-3.58) (0.49) (-0.66) (0.79) (5.46) (0.86)
9 -151972 0.2515 -0.2923 0.2319 21050 0.2807 0.0393 775 1.794
(-4.56) (1.48) (-2.01) (1.90) (0.30) (0.99)
10 70629 0.1807 0.1058 -0.1261 40457 0.0598 0.0324 113 1.231
(0.65) (0.67) (0.69) (-0.87) (0.28) (0.76)
11 -7872 0.1197 -0.0727 0.0739 9299 -0.2268 0.0198 798 1.813
(-1.79) (1.14) (-0.70) (0.80) (1.08) (-1.16)
12 24081 -0.1370 -0.0267 0.0463 83078 -0.1522 0.0315 577 1.966
(1.39) (-1.04) (-0.27) (0.52) (3.04) (-1.29)
13 2466 0.0821 -0.0741 0.0682 21148 -0.9636 0.7315 1701 1.858
(1.99) (1.68) (-1.36) (1.45) (8.65) (-39.87)
Growth 14 65744 -0.0062 0.0021 0.0017 24462 -0.0201 0.0033 6005 1.803
(2.77) (-0.37) (0.14) (0.14) (0.59) (-0.47)
15 -921788 -0.3179 -0.8574 0.1934 -5527047 -1.0838 0.4764 127 2.059
(-1.33) (-0.11) (-11.12) (6.00) (-1.82) (-1.04)
16 -653660 0.5128 -0.7699 0.2659 -4683619 -0.7729 0.2007 120 2.045
(-0.41) (1.15) (-2.92) (2.62) (-2.09) (-1.53)
17 14762 0.0750 -0.0324 0.0285 18329 -0.5298 0.0136 1638 2.277
(0.70) (1.25) (-0.43) (0.39) (0.40) (-0.95)
18 -6422 0.0050 -0.0053 0.0040 8105 0.0286 0.0002 7674 1.968
(-0.80) (0.86) (-0.70) (0.89) (0.39) (0.54)
Neutral 19 -9178 0.0021 -0.0076 0.0118 54078 0.0094 0.0072 7605 1.813
(-1.08) (0.29) (-0.69) (1.13) (2.05) (0.09)
20 -44091 -0.0440 0.0468 -0.0387 23420 -0.0707 0.0030 1510 1.598
(-1.50) (-0.67) (0.69) (-0.63) (0.41) (-0.54)
21 20961 0.0124 -0.0304 0.0185 -3138 -0.1364 0.0156 1768 1.723
(1.10) (0.77) (-1.48) (1.00) (-0.06) (-1.54)
22 -5410 0.0045 -0.0478 0.0566 10471 -0.0004 0.0276 2150 1.716
(-1.37) (0.31) (-2.15) (2.47) (1.43) (-0.01)
23 -9104 0.1483 -0.1265 0.1089 21150 -0.5877 0.0326 836 1.998
(-2.09) (1.55) (-1.12) (1.12) (2.66) (-1.79)
24 14587 0.3488 -0.0430 -0.0256 -12967 0.4650 0.0359 453 2.590
(0.70) (2.02) (-0.35) (-0.27) (-0.49) (1.88)
Other 25 2832 0.0261 -0.0182 0.0168 -998 0.1515 0.0070 5187 1.841
(0.63) (1.53) (-0.75) (0.72) (-0.13) (1.66)
26 -28998 -0.0461 0.0401 -0.0203 52553 -0.0856 0.0085 1531 1.797
(-3.59) (-2.01) (2.20) (-1.55) (2.34) (-1.21)
27 -23387 0.1922 -0.2382 0.1585 47191 -1.1412 0.0549 580 1.977
(-2.04) (1.69) (-2.72) (2.48) (2.21) (-2.18)
Value 28 5333 0.0079 0.0054 -0.0050 -33877 -0.2755 0.0068 7703 1.953
(0.38) (0.29) (0.23) (-0.22) (-1.15) (-2.06)
29 36854 0.1000 0.0259 -0.0618 22266 -0.2567 0.0105 1321 1.740
(1.94) (0.47) (0.60) (-0.80) (0.52) (-1.67)
30 104882 -0.0155 -0.0136 0.0010 -66402 -0.9418 0.0685 2912 2.069
(5.67) (-1.13) (-0.80) (0.09) (-1.22) (-6.21)
31 20415 0.0845 -0.1992 0.2428 142560 -0.2567 0.0999 384 1.618
(0.77) (0.38) (-1.26) (1.76) (2.75) (-1.37)
Table 5: Trade analysis regression - Individual securities (continued)
Fund 
Investment 
Style Fund Constant
Highwater 
mark
Value of 
Holdings Cost Basis
Above 
Highwater 
mark?
Value 
above 
highwater 
mark Rsq N
Durbin 
Watson 
Statistic
Value 32 127096 0.0764 -0.1026 0.0569 -15492 -1.3006 0.0919 531 1.662
(2.71) (0.28) (-1.02) (0.74) (-0.19) (-15.23)
33 39709 0.5788 -0.2719 0.1895 12601 0.0227 0.0536 946 2.502
(2.42) (1.74) (-1.14) (0.91) (0.53) (0.07)
34 188 0.0060 0.0438 -0.0453 32431 -0.7870 0.0231 1319 1.934
(0.02) (0.09) (0.50) (-0.60) (2.11) (-4.12)
35 25024 0.0330 -0.0813 0.0798 23780 -0.2567 0.0761 724 1.849
(2.76) (1.26) (-1.74) (2.49) (1.29) (-3.74)
36 36265 0.1262 -0.2301 0.1899 -3328 -0.7448 0.1322 327 1.492
(1.76) (1.76) (-2.39) (2.52) (-0.10) (-1.93)
37 26974 0.0025 0.0011 -0.0017 -77054 -0.1706 0.0030 13146 1.901
(1.02) (0.48) (0.23) (-0.48) (-1.12) (-2.91)
Passive/ 38 150863 0.1232 -0.0979 0.0705 -120898 0.0573 0.0156 5096 2.637
Enhanced (2.16) (1.50) (-1.35) (1.29) (-1.51) (1.43)
39 9842 0.0259 -0.0268 0.0189 38262 -0.2609 0.0146 7189 2.614
(1.00) (1.22) (-1.03) (0.87) (0.65) (-1.99)
40 97808 0.1031 -0.2722 0.2084 79714 -1.8362 0.0059 13325 2.098
(0.92) (1.01) (-0.95) (0.87) (0.32) (-1.12)
This table gives results regressing the value of trading on trade date i, on three variables defined in the event of a loss: an estimate of 
the highwatermark, given as the previous highest value of holdings in excess of cost, on the current value of holdings prior to any new 
purchases or sales on that trade date, and on the cost basis of those holdings. In addition, we include a dummy variable δi equal to one 
if the net value of the position exceeds the current highwatermark, and a measure of the extent to which the net value of the fund 
exceeds the current highwatermark. The value of trading is defined as the change in net position valued at the close of day price less  
passive fund flow defined as total net fund inflow apportioned to each security relative to percentage holdings at the end of the 
preceding month. t-statistics in parentheses are based on White heteroskedasticity consistent estimates of the standard error of each 
coefficient.
Table 6: Trade analysis regression - Equity Allocation
Fund 
Investment 
Style Fund Constant
Highwater 
mark
Value of 
Holdings Cost Basis
Above 
Highwater 
mark?
Value 
above 
highwater Rsq N
Durbin 
Watson 
Statistic
GARP 1 917229 0.0017 0.8177 -0.8876 103684979 1.2329 0.9577 1722 1.558
(2.19) (4.33) (37.18) (-27.58) (3.39) (103.71)
2 -363561 0.0004 -0.0061 -0.0121 2512263 -0.0411 0.0042 1392 1.953
(-0.55) (0.19) (-1.01) (-1.43) (1.68) (-1.66)
3 -4592820 0.0037 0.0953 -0.0464 5119733 0.0539 0.1539 1440 1.657
(-4.43) (1.54) (7.89) (-3.34) (1.70) (8.39)
4 -209190 0.0152 0.5626 -0.5631 -5765604 1.2650 0.6798 741 1.604
(-0.73) (3.43) (5.85) (-5.05) (-1.69) (9.15)
5 -293957 0.0011 0.9440 -0.8280 45384829 1.4097 0.9351 1615 1.698
(-4.78) (1.40) (82.04) (-33.60) (3.44) (15.50)
6 -181582 0.0132 0.6415 -0.5601 167587 1.9731 0.8400 527 1.497
(-4.03) (3.08) (16.97) (-13.48) (0.20) (5.26)
7 -1088889 0.0347 0.6537 -0.6553 5533107 0.6528 0.5977 243 1.507
(-3.92) (2.63) (7.27) (-7.45) (1.36) (1.94)
8 -262772 0.0193 0.2911 -0.2579 2015387 0.2223 0.4900 356 1.329
(-2.17) (5.58) (4.86) (-3.62) (0.85) (2.76)
9 -907592 0.0372 0.6161 -0.6254 8197659 0.5563 0.5751 241 1.752
(-5.01) (4.71) (7.20) (-7.51) (1.16) (1.19)
10 160732 -0.0362 0.5284 -0.5068 512488 0.2936 0.5507 55 1.628
(1.31) (-2.41) (7.60) (-6.87) (0.82) (2.68)
11 -20191 0.0154 0.3068 -0.2950 239839 0.8235 0.3814 226 1.798
(-0.85) (0.97) (4.48) (-4.20) (2.30) (1.22)
12 90240 0.0107 0.4285 -0.4491 759678 0.8457 0.5337 185 1.445
(2.47) (0.70) (4.93) (-4.60) (2.77) (5.24)
13 -6000 0.0067 0.1799 -0.1548 452249 0.3092 0.4944 597 1.826
(-1.16) (2.10) (7.58) (-5.43) (2.05) (6.08)
Growth 14 -3898377 0.0197 0.7274 -0.6907 48292636 4.4856 0.8431 1472 1.598
(-8.37) (3.51) (23.08) (-17.06) (2.20) (8.37)
15 -636798 -0.0002 0.5419 -0.5427 26432746 -0.0879 0.3973 183 1.599
(-0.49) (0.00) (2.33) (-2.92) (10.90) (-11.72)
16 9021113 -0.3169 2.0745 -1.7561 9074908 -0.0864 0.5878 208 1.933
(3.75) (-1.82) (6.24) (-4.67) (0.50) (-0.14)
17 -141170 0.0045 0.9158 -0.8812 4879554 1.7001 0.9348 870 1.807
(-3.36) (4.36) (40.94) (-29.39) (2.40) (17.00)
18 -480725 0.0173 0.5229 -0.5203 15065411 -1.0975 0.7261 1132 2.028
(-2.37) (3.43) (22.35) (-11.94) (4.12) (-0.87)
Neutral 19 -8102503 0.0655 0.8416 -0.9141 33626445 3.7045 0.8366 439 1.626
(-6.34) (6.49) (20.49) (-17.10) (1.91) (5.46)
20 -133745 0.0332 0.7479 -0.7198 9518295 2.5213 0.7868 448 1.684
(-0.58) (2.87) (23.40) (-21.29) (3.22) (2.60)
21 888695 -0.0122 0.3200 -0.3682 -706272 0.5821 0.4548 677 1.570
(4.47) (-3.19) (10.55) (-11.19) (-0.72) (2.56)
22 -279281 0.0126 0.4497 -0.4116 4973898 0.1922 0.7243 586 1.821
(-6.74) (3.24) (5.40) (-4.08) (1.29) (4.73)
23 -9384 -0.0024 0.8472 -0.7943 1126855 1.0080 0.8791 738 1.195
(-1.58) (-2.29) (31.31) (-12.03) (1.46) (2.91)
24 -159265 0.0276 0.8100 -0.6703 23601 1.8757 0.8689 305 2.105
(-4.66) (2.58) (11.48) (-8.55) (0.16) (5.08)
Other 25 -294300 0.0206 0.6449 -0.6544 166909 0.4632 0.8523 1441 1.367
(-7.02) (10.91) (17.78) (-13.94) (0.53) (75.84)
26 -151628 0.0172 0.4491 -0.3593 1310217 0.6969 0.7104 587 1.924
(-3.00) (4.87) (12.01) (-8.16) (1.14) (3.46)
27 -45911 0.0127 0.8189 -0.6708 1296457 1.0411 0.8784 346 2.015
(-2.53) (4.17) (38.41) (-19.59) (1.33) (9.65)
Value 28 726075 -0.0006 0.9365 -1.0641 51029474 3.0266 0.9219 1992 1.910
(6.81) (-0.36) (125.16) (-44.05) (3.38) (5.38)
29 -76807 0.0072 0.5664 -0.5817 -71306 1.0152 0.8450 361 1.893
(-1.29) (3.60) (4.22) (-3.66) (-0.07) (79.35)
30 -2124627 0.0481 0.7946 -0.4989 9073063 2.7575 0.8891 1463 1.386
(-12.70) (15.48) (76.34) (-34.62) (2.22) (11.24)
31 -7073 0.0110 0.2802 -0.2538 748255 0.3916 0.3947 243 1.929
(-0.12) (0.87) (3.72) (-2.80) (1.84) (2.39)
Table 6: Trade analysis regression - Equity Allocation (continued)
Fund 
Investment 
Style Fund Constant
Highwater 
mark
Value of 
Holdings Cost Basis
Above 
Highwater 
mark?
Value 
above 
highwater 
mark Rsq N
Durbin 
Watson 
Statistic
Value 32 9055067 -0.3961 0.3286 -0.2595 * * 0.6775 199 1.645
(5.75) (-5.74) (6.21) (-5.98)
33 12240 0.0030 0.7228 -0.7447 178222 0.7746 0.7069 548 1.661
(0.93) (0.68) (14.71) (-13.08) (1.74) (37.23)
34 -326129 0.0141 0.9234 -0.9435 1693518 0.8933 0.9928 344 1.946
(-7.25) (6.18) (38.02) (-22.88) (2.19) (30.60)
35 11453 -0.0105 0.5256 -0.4395 152844 0.6532 0.4907 559 1.705
(0.88) (-0.96) (9.23) (-8.40) (1.73) (1.27)
36 -31414 0.0138 0.0516 -0.0459 125280 0.3651 0.4562 75 2.122
(-0.94) (1.57) (1.12) (-0.98) (1.80) (28.57)
37 11998927 -0.0015 0.8447 -0.9926 175982127 5.2571 0.9361 2937 1.402
(14.34) (-0.35) (84.18) (-46.52) (2.88) (3.70)
Passive/ 38 -38577 0.0017 0.1472 -0.1570 -6901802 1.1976 0.6451 742 1.985
Enhanced (-0.21) (1.43) (1.90) (-1.93) (-1.10) (4.34)
39 165407 0.0015 0.0471 -0.0627 2295272 -0.0131 0.0739 1405 1.890
(0.83) (1.14) (1.17) (-1.76) (1.92) (-2.19)
40 -937852 0.0055 -0.1452 0.1703 34988355 0.8117 0.0064 1621 1.987
(-0.78) (0.40) (-0.21) (0.23) (1.26) (0.94)
This table gives results regressing the change in equity allocation on trade date i, on three variables defined in the event of a loss: an 
estimate of the highwatermark, given as the previous highest value of holdings in excess of cost, on the current value of holdings prior 
to any new purchases or sales on that trade date, and on the cost basis of those holdings. In addition, we include a dummy variable δi 
equal to one if the net value of the position exceeds the current highwatermark, and a measure of the extent to which the net value of 
the fund exceeds the current highwatermark. The change in equity allocation is defined as the change in equity position valued at the 
close of day price less  passive fund flow defined as total net fund inflow apportioned to equity according to the percentage invested in 
equity at the end of the preceding month. t-statistics in parentheses are based on White heteroskedasticity consistent estimates of the 
standard error of each coefficient.
* There were only two trading days in the sample where fund 32 traded above its highwatermark. Hence it was not possible to 
separately estimate the coefficients on the highwatermark dummy variable and the fund value above highwatermark in this case.
Table 7: Trade analysis regression - Individual securities by fund category
Category
Highwate
rmark
Value of 
Holdings
Cost 
Basis
Value above 
highwatermark Rsq N DW
Style GARP 0.03349 -0.04208 0.03119 -1.01786 0.8089 31321 2.12
(3.18) (-3.27) (2.90) (-37.36)
Growth 0.04222 -0.00588 -0.00792 -0.65049 0.1456 15564 1.96
(1.35) (-0.29) (-0.49) (-2.01)
Neutral 0.00194 -0.00770 0.01160 -0.05636 0.0070 14322 1.76
(0.28) (-0.74) (1.19) (-0.86)
Other 0.01676 -0.00993 0.01124 0.07829 0.0068 7298 1.84
(1.13) (-0.49) (0.59) (1.09)
Value 0.00234 0.00122 -0.00191 -0.20505 0.0038 29313 1.90
(0.47) (0.29) (-0.56) (-3.39)
0.08228 -0.13338 0.09827 -0.24295 0.0026 25610 2.12
(1.96) (-1.43) (1.38) (-1.31)
Size of fund Small 0.17745 -0.16480 0.07870 -0.61851 0.0216 18668 2.09
(1.69) (-1.30) (0.72) (-2.14)
Large 0.01282 -0.01232 0.01039 -1.00998 0.7284 104760 2.05
(2.50) (-2.15) (2.03) (-32.18)
Few 0.17745 -0.16480 0.07870 -0.61851 0.0216 18668 2.09
(1.69) (-1.30) (0.72) (-2.14)
Many 0.01282 -0.01232 0.01039 -1.00998 0.7284 104760 2.05
(2.50) (-2.15) (2.03) (-32.18)
Small 0.03831 -0.00611 -0.00660 -0.61980 0.1421 28700 1.95
(1.30) (-0.30) (-0.41) (-2.04)
Large 0.01985 -0.02077 0.01686 -1.00942 0.4060 94728 2.10
(3.60) (-3.23) (3.01) (-31.85)
No 0.02254 -0.01857 0.00635 -0.67955 0.0175 61576 2.07
(0.64) (-0.86) (0.33) (-2.32)
Yes 0.01889 -0.01905 0.01606 -1.00930 0.7228 61852 2.14
(3.32) (-2.97) (2.77) (-31.75)
No 0.01573 -0.01566 0.01147 -1.00661 0.3919 106393 2.09
(2.62) (-2.26) (1.91) (-30.34)
Yes 0.04169 -0.02241 0.01686 -0.04305 0.0199 17035 1.82
(1.80) (-1.13) (0.96) (-0.78)
No 0.00285 0.00072 -0.00147 -0.18755 0.0045 39160 1.90
(0.58) (0.17) (-0.43) (-3.41)
Yes 0.02517 -0.03210 0.02198 -1.00985 0.4064 84268 2.10
(2.79) (-2.65) (2.37) (-32.10)
No 0.02606 -0.01823 0.01679 0.15146 0.0070 5187 1.84
(1.53) (-0.75) (0.72) (1.66)
Yes 0.01577 -0.01570 0.01150 -1.00618 0.3910 118241 2.09
(2.64) (-2.27) (1.92) (-30.12)
No 0.04889 -0.02895 0.01437 -0.34534 0.0748 41118 2.12
(2.34) (-1.59) (0.96) (-2.14)
Yes 0.01148 -0.01167 0.00925 -1.01934 0.4320 82310 2.08
(2.98) (-2.47) (2.41) (-39.38)
No 0.01573 -0.01566 0.01147 -1.00661 0.3919 106393 2.09
(2.62) (-2.26) (1.91) (-30.34)
Yes 0.04169 -0.02241 0.01686 -0.04305 0.0199 17035 1.82
(1.80) (-1.13) (0.96) (-0.78)
Passive/ 
Enhanced 
Number of 
Securities
Number of 
Transactions
Annual Bonus
Domestic 
owned
Equity 
Ownership by 
senior staff
Largest 10 
Institutional 
Manager
Boutique firm
Bank or Life 
office affiliated

